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Abstract
This paper examines switching decisions by households in the MainPower dis-
tribution area of New Zealand. The paper measures the extent to which customers
switched in response to information about directors’ bonuses, marketing surround-
ing firm ownership, and work by the New Zealand Electricity Authority to promote
switching behaviour. The first two events demonstrate the magnitude of consumer
concerns about firm governance in an Electricity market. The latter provides a
measure of search costs in a market where no central switching service is provided.
Retail customers play an important role in the risk-management strategies of gentailer
companies. Firms who have retail market shares equal to their production shares are
less inclined to exert market power in wholesale markets, and are also, given the fixed
prices negotiated with customers, relatively immune to fluctuations in wholesale prices
(Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008)). Risk management may encourage gentailers to
target a particular market share. More aggressive firms may choose to take a position
that leaves them as net buyers or sellers in the wholesale market. In either case, however,
a firm will frequently have a desired level of retail market penetration.
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A regulator concerned with market power, in contrast, may desire firms’ market shares
to align with their productive capacity. The regulator may also want to see customers
exhibiting elastic demand for electricity, thereby moving oligopolistic supply in the market
closer to competitive equilibria. These two objectives encourage a regulator to first
encourage hedging by firms (whether through derivative contracts or vertical integration)
and second to encourage customers to move retailers in response to price competition.
Giulietti, Grossi, and Waterson (2010a) shows that, in the English/Welsh market, there
is a weak link between wholesale prices and retail prices, meaning that market power in
the retail market is an important determinant of consumer prices.
The behaviour of customer switching in electricity markets is thus of interest to both
firms who are targeting one particular market share and also regulators who may be
targeting another particular set of market shares, and hoping to achieve a healthy level
of “churn” amongst customers. This paper seeks to explore the motivations behind
electricity retail customer movements.
Brennan (2007) reports that most jurisdictions, with the exception of Britain, have
exhibited very low switching rates, as customers seem reluctant, in deregulated markets,
to move from their initially assigned retailer. He notes that New Zealand has the second
highest switching rate, but that this still leaves 75% of customers having not switched
(at time of writing). Defeuilley (2009) attributes low switching rates and suboptimal
behaviour of households to behavioural biases encouraging customers to stick with the
“status quo”, and risk aversion. He also comments that in many cases retail offerings
have been less innovative than would be expected, and customers may not have been
offered something “new” by incoming retailers. Defeuilley’s view is consistent with Giuli-
etti, Waddams, and Waterson (2005)’s survey evidence that search costs are perceived
to be high for many customers. In contrast, Littlechild (2009) remarks that most dereg-
ulated markets are seeing growing switching behaviour over time. Economically, this is
important for retailers: Giulietti, Otero, and Waterson (2010b) document that since pri-
vatisation, in the the UK market, prices for incumbents have not converged, presumably
suggesting that they can exploit inertia in customer switching decisions (Puller and West
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(2013) makes similar observations for the US market, while Su (2014) notes that US
price declines were concentrated in early years of deregulation rather than ongoing). In
a subsequent working paper (Giulietti, Waterson, and Wildenbeest (2010c)), the authors
use a theoretical model of customer reluctance to switch to infer customer search costs
from the dispersion of prices. Some level of obfuscation may be in the interests of mar-
ket participants, as shown by Kalayci and Potters (2010). Wilson and Waddams Price
(2010) shows that although most customers who had switched retailers were motivated
by costs, a fifth of customers lost economic surplus by switching. Waddams Price and
Zhu (2013) notes that UK retailers had followed the practice of pricing higher in their
“home” jurisdictions than they do when competing in other regions; this practice being
banned in 2009.
We hypothesise that retail customers are motivated by several factors in making a
decision to switch retailers. First, we assume that customers are motivated by price
concerns. If a competitor offers a lower price, customers will be inclined to switch retailer.
This is mitigated by search costs, and so customers may not move if the gains from
switching are small. Secondly, however, customers may be motivated by their opinions of
the companies concerned. Electricity is a homogeneous product, but electricity retailers
may need to be concerned about their corporate image. Thirdly, many customers may
be unaware of the possibility of switching, or may have partial information regarding
the benefits that can be gained. Hence we might expect that marketing on the part of
a regulator who makes this information available to customers may result in more fluid
switching behaviour.
This paper makes use of an extensive data set covering the North Canterbury region
of New Zealand, provided by the local Lines Company, MainPower. The New Zealand
electricity market separates retail and generation activities from ownership of distribution
networks. Retailers compete for customers in a region, but the lines company has a
monopoly on distribution activities. As such, MainPower observes all switching activity
in the region.
We examine the transfers between retailers of ICPs (individual meters) to changes in
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retail prices. We also examine the responses of customers to three events. First, we exam-
ine the response of customers to Contact Energy’s Directors’ remuneration. In September
2008, Contact announced that it was jointly raising retail prices, and also paying substan-
tial bonuses to its Directors. We examine whether this event caused increased switching
activity amongst customers; were customers concerned with the governance of Contact’s
board? Second, we examine a marketing campaign, in which Trustpower marketed itself
as being more desirable on the strength of being a trust (as opposed to a company, as is
the case for most other retailers). Did customer response to this campaign indicate a pref-
erence over ownership structure for their retailer? In this regard, we examine consumer
desire to engage in “ethical” behaviour. Sen, G urhan-Canli, and Morwitz (2001) argue
that even in the presence of an organised boycott of a particular product, consumers
have weak incentives to participate: at the margin, they are unlikely to achieve change,
and potentially face high costs in terms of suboptimal consumption patterns to achieve
this. On the other hand, Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) argue that individuals may engage
in ethical behaviour as a signalling tool. By engaging in costly activities, an individual
signals that they may have preferences of a particular type, which allows them to relate
to others with similar preferences. This is potentially an economically significant issue:
Arnot, Boxall, and Cash (2006) shows that in the coffee market, fair trade coffee has
a markedly lower price elasticity than other products, implying that under oligopolistic
competition, ethical products may have higher profit margins.
Lastly, we examine the introduction of the “What’s my Number?” campaign by the
Electricity Authority. In this campaign, the market regulator provided a website to help
customers estimate the savings they could achieve by switching retailer. By examining
this event, we see whether educational work by the regulator can lower switching costs
and achieve a higher rate of customer movement.
Existing empirical work on individual customer switching behaviour has been sparse.
Giulietti et al. (2005) examine behaviour of gas customers in the United Kingdom,
who face the opportunity of switching from British Gas to new entrants in the mar-
ket. Hortac¸su, Madanizadeh, and Puller (2014) study the switching behaviour of Texas
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residents in the wake of deregulation. Giulietti et al.’s (2005) survey data shows that
old age pensioners are considerably less likely to switch retailers, while more densely
populated areas are fruitful grounds for customer mobility, and likely to be targetted by
retailers looking to poach customers.
The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines our method-
ology. Section 2 describes our data set. Section 3 presents the empirical results of our
work, while Section 4 concludes.
1 Methodology
This paper makes use of the Conditional Logit model (McFadden (1973)) to explain
household switching behaviour. We assume that household i in month t receives utility
from retailer j according to the following equation
Ui,j,t =
∑
k
βkXi,j,t,k + ǫi,j,t,
where Xi,j,t are a set of characteristics that vary across households, retailers and time.
These are observable to the econometrician. ǫi,j,t is a term that is unobservable to the
econometrician, but assumed to be logistically distributed. As such, we can evaluate the
probability that a household chooses a particular retailer (j) as
e
∑
k βkXi,j,t,k∑
j′ e
∑
k βkXi,j′,t,k
.
With this set of probabilities, the parameters (βk) can be found by maximising the like-
lihood that a household chooses the particular retailer observed in a particular month,
i.e.:
max
β1,...,βN
∏
i
∏
t
e
∑
k βkXi,j(i,t),t,k∑
j′ e
∑
k βkXi,j′,t,k
where j(i, t) is household i’s observed time t choice of retailer. In our estimation of
standard errors, we allow for clustering across households, following Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2011).
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1.1 Price effects
We assume that households have a preference for cheaper retail rates, so our first ex-
planatory variable is relative price:
Xi,j,t,1 =
Pj,t
Pj(i,t−1),t
,
i.e. the price of a competitor relative to the household’s incumbent retailer. This effect is
offset by search costs, ans we therefore allow our second term to be a preference for the
household’s incumbent retailer:
Xi,j,t,2 =


1 if j = j(i, t− 1)
0 otherwise.
A high estimate for β2 therefore represents higher search costs, manifested as greater in-
ertia amongst customers. By interacting demographic or time series variables with Xi,j,t,2
we can examine the effect of variables that might increase/decrease inertia (such as the
“What’s my number?” campaign). By interacting variables with Xi,j,t,1 we can examine
variables that might increase a household’s sensitivity to prices (such as seasonal/weather
variables that might proxy for a household having experienced high power bills).
Hortac¸su et al. (2014) highlight the importance of identification of inertia effects in
a model, and point out that including firm dummies cannot explain the long periods
that customers spend with individual retailers. In their model, they break the switching
decision into a two-step process, where customers first make a decision to “shop around”,
while in the second stage, they choose a retailer from the set of competitors. In our case,
we incorporate the first decision into our model by way of the incumbent dummy: most
customers will have a substantial preference for their existing retailer in a given month,
resulting in long periods with no switching for most customers. We believe that this
achieves a similar outcome to Hortac¸su et al.’s (2014) approach, and by interacting with
price effects we can model customers becoming more or less active in the market. Where
we feel our approach has a slight advantage is in interpretation: since the coefficients are
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being estimated in the same logit formulation, it is easy for us to interpret the economic
significance of inertia, as demonstrated in Section 3.2. In section 3.2.1, we check the
robustness of our approach by considering a sub-sample of customers, restricted to be
only those who switch at least once in the sample.
2 Data
Our data covers the period May 2007-December 2012. The data used in this project can
be split into four subsets: switching data, electricity usage, demographics and weather
information.
2.1 Switching
Switching information is provided by MainPower, the lines company who provides distri-
bution services in North Canterbury. Data is anonymised by meshblock, and covers all
connections and terminations.
Figure 1 shows the dispersion of ICPs across the region, and provides an idea of the
demographic character of North Canterbury. The region contains some urban areas in
the South: Rangiora and Kaiapoi. There are also some smaller towns scattered across the
region: Kaikoura, Waipara, and Culverden. The region is also characterised by large rural
areas. North Canterbury has varied terrain; the region is dominated by the Canterbury
plain, but in the West is bounded by the Southern Alps, and in the North by the hills
surrounding Kaikoura.
The region is divided into seven Grid Exit Points (GXPs) where each ICP is assigned
to one GXP (see 1). Ashley11 includes a direct connection to the transmission network
by a fibre board factory. We exclude Ashley11 from our work on electricity usage, since
its offtake is dominated by the fibre board factory. However, since many small ICPs are
also connected, we include Ashley11 ICPs in our switching work.
There are 38 880 ICPs in the region, and we observe 16 633 switches during the period.
A histogram of number of switches observed for each ICP is given in figure 2.
7
CU L033 1
SBK0 331
WPR 0331
WPR 0661
CU L066 1
KA I00 01
ASY 0111
Auckland
Wellington
Christchurch
0 400km
0 300mi
0 20 40 km
0 10 20 30 mi
Legend
GXPcoverages
ICP
NIWA climate station
Figure 1: The MainPower region.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 104
Number of switches
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 2: Histogram of number of switches for an ICP in the MainPower region.
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Figure 3: Market shares (as percentage) for the MainPower region.
Contact Energy is the incumbent firm from deregulation, and at the start of the
sample, accounts for roughly 90% of ICPs in the region. Over the course of the sample
period, this portion declines and the retail shares become more evenly distributed across
retailers, see figure 3.
2.2 Electricity Usage
Electricity offtakes are available at a Grid Exit Point (GXP) level (see figure 1). We
aggregate daily offtakes into monthly observations (see figures 5 and 6). Electricity use
fluctuates in most areas, and often shows strong seasonal patterns. These patterns can
exhibit high mid-year (winter) usage (see for example Kaiapoi11) or high year end (sum-
mer) usage (see for example Waipara33).
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Figure 4: Prices offered by retailers for the MainPower region. Note that Kaiapoi cus-
tomers, due to a slightly different contractual arrangement with the MainPower lines
company, can, theoretically be offered a different tariff to other customers. The prices
listed here are for non-Kaiapoi customers; differences for Kaiapoi customers are mini-
mal (Genesis Kaiapoi customers saved 2.15 c/KWh extra in May-August 2007, Trust-
Power Kaiapoi customers paid an extra 0.11 c/KWh from May-September 2010, and 0.12
c/KWh thereon). Tiny Mighty Power was only available in Kaiapoi, so the prices listed
here are for Kaiapoi customers.
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2.3 Demographics
Since our data is anonymised at a Meshblock level, we can connect our switching data to
Statistics New Zealand data concerning house sizes, and general demographic information
for the area.
We further create GXP level information by weighting meshblock information accord-
ing to the number of ICPs attached to a particular GXP that lie in each meshblock. GXP
level information is used for electricity usage estimation (see section 3.1) while meshblock
level information is used for switching estimation (see section 3.2).
2.4 Weather
Weather information is available from the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric
Research (NIWA). NIWA has a range of weather stations scattered across the North
Canterbury region (see figure 1). For each ICP, we take the weather reading from the
closest weather station. We then generate an average across all ICPs associated with a
particular GXP to generate GXP level weather parameters. This provides us with two
data-sets. As with demographic data, GXP level data is used for electricity demand
estimation, while meshblock level data is used for switching estimation.
3 Results
We first investigate the electricity offtakes in the MainPower/North Canterbury region.
Then we turn our attention to the actual switching decisions of the ICPs.
3.1 Electricity Demand
We use our panel data on GXP offtakes and the demographic information to explore the
sensitivity of electricity demand to household characteristics and weather.
In Table 1 we aggregate across GXPs. This allows us to explore the effect of demo-
graphic variables, which vary in the cross-section. We find that rain and soil moisture
have a negative impact on electricity usage, while temperature and hours of sunlight have
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Variable Coeff. T-stat Coeff T-stat
Constant 2977.1077 3.0188 2481.4082 2.6657
Rain -0.42172231 -0.417 0.28806895 0.31715
Sun 0.65279703 0.37923 2.4509189 2.3701
Soil Moisture -22.523171 -1.7264 -33.299149 -3.5615
Temperature 16.080464 1.1728 4.5756082 0.37651
ICP Density -7545.9209 -7.7247 -7572.5424 -7.6161
Proportion Four Bedroom House -312.17372 -7.9881 -310.44548 -7.7723
Proportion Household
Income 100001+ 578.78461 7.0055 575.96347 6.8205
Proportion Age 65+ 181.72713 2.9826 186.33366 2.9911
Dummy Feb -462.11331 -2.3525
Dummy Mar -516.56403 -2.6182
Dummy Apr -662.01083 -2.9868
Dummy May -681.33873 -2.8033
Dummy Jun -610.3638 -2.0214
Dummy Jul -420.72073 -1.4164
Dummy Aug -497.21565 -1.6702
Dummy Sep -705.22995 -2.5437
Dummy Oct -607.16922 -2.4692
Dummy Nov -300.98275 -1.5325
Dummy Dec -64.083451 -0.35779
Soil Moisture*ICP Density 76.639945 4.044 80.697296 4.2628
R2 0.441 0.394
Table 1: Whole sample model for electricity usage. Dependent variable is GXP offtake in
a given month. Two specifications are fit, one including dummy variables for months, and
the other without. Variables described as Proportions refer to the proportion of census
respondents in a meshblock who answered affirmatively; i.e. Proportion Four Bedroom
House refers to the proportion of census respondents who live in a four bedroom house.
a positive impact. This supports the hypothesis that electricity usage in the region is sig-
nificantly impacted by use of irrigation, predominately a dry weather activity. Seasonal
dummy variables suggest that peak electricity usage is in December and January.
Demographically, we find that higher incomes and greater numbers of retirees increase
electricity usage. Interestingly, the proportion of four bedroom place of dwelling in a
meshblock (a proxy for the prevalence of larger houses, since most dwellings in the region
are 1-4 bedrooms) has a negative impact on electricity usage.
Lastly, by interacting ICP density with soil moisture, we uncover a positive term,
indicating that electricity usage is less sensitive to soil moisture in more urbanised GXPs.
We next break the sample into individual GXPs. Table 2 shows the results of this.
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Since we have disaggregated the cross-sectional element of the data, we can no longer
estimate demographic effects. However, it is interesting to examine the effects of weather
variables.
Figure 5 shows the results of trying to explain electricity usage with weather vari-
ables alone. For Culverden33, Waipara33 and Kaiapoi11, the regular seasonal pat-
terns in the data are well explained by seasonal patterns in weather. However, for
Culverden66/Kaikoura33, Waipara66 and Southbrook33, performance is considerably
weaker. Figure 6 shows results once monthly seasonal dummies are incorporated. Cul-
verden66/Kaikoura33, in particular shows a much improved estimation, suggesting that
seasonal tourist visitors in December/January can explain much of the fluctuations in
usage.
3.2 Switching Behaviour
We next turn our attention to customer switching behaviour. Given that our electricity
demand results suggest that customers may have varying electricity usage based upon
weather effects and demography, we include these explanatory variables as factors that
may make a customer more or less likely to switch. Specifically, we interact these variables
with relative pricing, so that customers who potentially have high power bills are more
likely to switch retailers when prices are materially different.
Given Contact’s preponderance in the region, we also include dummy variables for
each of the retailers, effectively allowing customers to have a preference for a particular
firm over others.
Table 3 contains our results. Our basic result is that customers have a very strong
preference for remaining with their incumbent retailer. With a coefficient for incumbent
retailer of 5.9828, we can infer that if all prices were identical, a customer has probability
e−5.9828 = 0.0025 of switching to a given competing retailer. Our index of -11.7842 on
price says that if an incumbent faced a competitor who was 10% cheaper, a customer
would have probability e−5.9828+0.1×11.7842 = 0.0080 of switching; price competition has
significant impact on customer churn.
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Culverden66/
Variable Culverden33 Kaiapoi11 Kaikoura33 Southbrook33 Waipara33 Waipara66
Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat Coeff. T-stat
Constant 5134.145 4.339 1978.702 7.077 1799.153 5.695 2539.375 7.370 1869.021 6.354 2034.989 2.731
Rain 2.628 1.273 -0.426 -0.488 0.523 1.052 -0.331 -0.349 -0.030 -0.042 0.898 0.554
Sun 9.537 3.286 -3.171 -4.316 2.536 3.280 -0.056 -0.062 -0.121 -0.171 1.965 1.018
Soil Moisture -125.150 -5.824 25.345 7.606 3.271 0.747 -0.794 -0.186 -15.838 -4.405 3.281 0.323
Temperature -31.021 -1.123 18.133 1.839 1.951 0.218 -4.441 -0.374 -9.528 -1.145 -8.471 -0.400
R
2 0.723 0.754 0.211 0.006 0.458 0.041
Constant 6670.075 4.738 1607.671 10.456 2310.307 7.110 2939.198 9.677 2091.035 6.356 2329.813 2.987
Rain -0.858 -0.417 0.555 1.234 0.803 1.987 0.024 0.031 -0.308 -0.390 2.692 1.661
Sun -1.442 -0.317 0.676 1.245 1.585 1.534 -0.281 -0.266 -0.038 -0.036 2.334 0.881
Soil Moisture -59.253 -1.960 2.927 0.905 -11.649 -1.872 -22.826 -3.369 -18.015 -2.519 -36.707 -2.362
Temperature 5.937 0.219 9.653 2.017 18.629 2.339 7.946 0.860 -9.661 -1.170 23.082 1.106
Dummy Feb -860.962 -1.907 -126.858 -1.850 -530.442 -5.183 -450.526 -3.408 -153.088 -1.413 -505.097 -1.796
Dummy Mar -1105.406 -2.402 86.355 1.232 -438.265 -4.368 -354.775 -2.629 -233.546 -2.135 -507.881 -1.832
Dummy Apr -2109.565 -3.991 208.835 2.751 -356.744 -2.995 -405.320 -2.762 -318.788 -2.590 -548.930 -1.732
Dummy May -2604.374 -4.495 598.523 7.190 -212.690 -1.641 -29.488 -0.181 -232.118 -1.616 57.526 0.161
Dummy Jun -2584.416 -3.700 904.323 8.368 -73.466 -0.479 319.857 1.508 -82.990 -0.413 730.047 1.624
Dummy Jul -2106.581 -3.197 1085.318 9.424 79.074 0.525 636.218 2.805 12.046 0.062 1019.215 2.475
Dummy Aug -2039.999 -3.166 889.873 7.740 49.603 0.329 563.108 2.482 -59.390 -0.298 1055.539 2.419
Dummy Sep -2013.115 -3.324 411.357 3.841 -31.611 -0.226 198.564 0.949 -209.356 -1.109 613.759 1.475
Dummy Oct -1600.611 -2.806 258.330 2.847 55.397 0.432 153.993 0.871 -212.194 -1.344 379.928 1.013
Dummy Nov -567.619 -1.247 89.862 1.270 -174.642 -1.758 142.831 1.052 -288.000 -2.488 242.743 0.847
Dummy Dec -177.651 -0.435 60.269 0.952 -44.016 -0.473 84.762 0.698 -95.549 -0.975 265.321 1.052
R
2 0.847 0.963 0.666 0.618 0.690 0.518
Table 2: Individual GXP demand regressions. Columns are GXPs under consideration. For each GXP, we consider two specifications:
one including monthly dummy variables and the other excluding them.
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Figure 5: Electricity offtakes by Grid Exit Point. Solid line represents observed offtakes,
dashed line represents fitted offtakes explained by weather variables.
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Figure 6: Electricity offtakes by Grid Exit Point. Solid line represents observed off-
takes, dashed line represents fitted offtakes explained by weather variables, augmented
by monthly dummies.
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Examining the Director Remuneration Incident, we find fairly weak effects in terms of
customer movements. During the early months (September-November 2008) Contact in
fact seemed to have better than usual retention of customers. However, December 2008
and January-March 2009 saw an outflow of customers. Indeed in January, with coefficient
-0.8007, we would conclude that the director remuneration effect was the equivalent of a
6.8% price differential. Contact’s approaching of former customers to “win them back”
had the expected effect of increasing the likelihood of former Contact customers switching
back to Contact except in month 6 (February 2009) when former Contact customers were
less likely than usual to return to Contact. Given that this month follows the largest
exodus month (January 2009) this may be seen to be the period in which the Director
effect was strongest.
Next we turn our attention to the various marketing campaigns held in the region.
The “What’s my number?” campaign, unsurprisingly, decreased customer loyalty. Again,
translating this to “discount equivalent” terms, this was equivalent in magnitude to a
4.97% price differential.
Interestingly, the largest effect is due to the Trustpower campaign, starting in February
2010, where Trustpower marketed itself as being New Zealand owned and being more
desirable due to its trust governance structure. This campaign gave Trustpower the
equivalent of a 15% price differential. Graphically, the effect of this campaign can be
seen in Figure 3: from February 2010 onward, each winter, Trustpower market shares
have risen, largely at the expense of Contact (as the incumbent) market shares.
The effect of Tiny Mighty Power’s official “entry” into the market seems to have been
largely negative. Examining Figure 3, Tiny Mighty Power had already gained a number
of customers in the lead up to their official entry. It appears that their extra marketing
around this time had little effect on customer switching.
The two earthquakes had opposite effects on ICP switches. Noting that considerable
migration was caused by the two earthquakes, we might expect to see more switching,
caused by customers moving into and out of the region. The first Canterbury Earthquake
(September 2010) caused a significant increase in incumbent effects, while the second
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earthquake caused a decline in incumbent retention power.
Our company control variables are not surprising. Each of the non-Contact firms has a
negative coefficient. Many customers have a strong preference for Contact. Interestingly,
Trustpower’s number is the most negative, reflecting its small market share prior to the
marketing campaign. However, the effect of the campaign is to largely offset this, resulting
in Trustpower being the second most popular retailer in the latter part of the sample.
Examining demographic effects, we find that large households and elderly households
exhibit less sensitivity to prices, while high income households are more sensitive. These
findings echo the survey evidence of (Giulietti et al. 2005). As might be suggested by
Figure 3 most switching goes on in the winter, as exhibited by the higher sensitivity to
prices during rainy months.
3.2.1 Movers
One concern with our work would be that many ICPs do not switch during the sample
period. This could raise an identification issue, in that with little movement, it would be
difficult to distinguish between preference for the retailer who happens to be an ICP’s
retailer at the start of the sample, and the incumbent ICP, since these would be one
and the same for non-switching ICPs. To examine whether this affects the results, we
next restrict our sample to ICPs who have switched at least once in the sample period,
effectively excluding “non movers”.
The results are reported in Table 4. Our basic finding regarding the strength of the
incumbent effect is robust. Our coefficients for incumbent and relative price change from
5.9828 to 5.7557 and -11.7842 to -11.7114. While the Incumbent coefficient difference
is statistically significant, due to our large sample, the coefficient change is numerically
similar. Repeating our calculation of the effect of a firm giving a 10% price cut, we find
that the probability of attracting an ICP is e−5.7557+0.1×11.7114 = 0.0102. Not surpris-
ingly, conditioning on ICPs that move, this sensitivity is slightly higher, but qualitatively
similar.
Our examination of the Director Remuneration period also becomes slightly clearer
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Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat
Incumbent 5.9828 341.2837
Relative Price -11.7842 -44.3879
Director Remuneration Events
Director 1 0.6285 4.3971 What’s my number? -0.5855 -17.0209
Director 2 0.7718 5.2021 Trustpower campaign 1.7676 30.8250
Director 3 0.7312 5.0216 Contact TP campaign 0.1271 3.5704
Director 4 -0.4102 -4.8307 Tiny Mighty Power -0.8422 -2.9853
Director 5 -0.8007 -11.1519 Sep. 2010 EQ 0.5812 17.4911
Director 6 -0.0573 -0.5521 Feb. 2011 EQ -0.1623 -3.7779
Director 7 -0.3928 -4.4210
Director 8 0.4159 3.4267
Director 9 0.2087 1.8955 Price Interaction
Director 10 0.2427 2.1750 ICP Density 0.0128 0.3774
Director 11 0.4693 3.7518 Prop 4 bedrooms 0.0013 2.1344
Director 12 0.0355 0.3461 Prop 100K+ income -0.0032 -3.9218
Prop Age 65+ 0.0028 4.3241
Contact recovery of lost customers Rain -0.0011 -8.0218
Old Cont. * Dir 1 – – Sun -0.0002 -1.0231
Old Cont. * Dir 2 1.6459 1.6367 Soil Moisture 0.0000 0.0459
Old Cont. * Dir 3 0.8913 0.8884 Temperature -0.0022 -1.1707
Old Cont. * Dir 4 1.5449 2.6601 ICP Dens.*Soil M. 0.0003 0.3200
Old Cont. * Dir 5 1.0319 2.0392
Old Cont. * Dir 6 -0.9823 -0.9794 Firm dummies
Old Cont. * Dir 7 -0.0216 -0.0372 Meridan Dummy -0.6831 -32.9643
Old Cont. * Dir 8 0.3622 0.9506 TMP Dummy -0.5399 -6.5264
Old Cont. * Dir 9 0.9095 3.2360 Genesis Dummy -1.7927 -43.7674
Old Cont. * Dir 10 0.3272 0.9139 Trustpower Dummy -1.9869 -36.4567
Old Cont. * Dir 11 0.6601 2.2571 Mercury Dummy -0.9539 -20.5503
Old Cont. * Dir 12 0.8324 3.1761 Pulse Dummy -1.3121 -12.8146
Table 3: Results for customer switching behaviour. Incumbent gives ICP utility from
remaining with current retailer. Price multiplied by retailer’s price relative to incumbent
gives utility from choosing said retailer (incumbent’s relative price is 1). Director 1 - Di-
rector 12 give utility from choosing Contact from start of Director compensation period
to 12 months after. Next coefficients give utility from choosing contact for a customer
who left during the Director compensation period (i.e. utility from returning to Contact).
“What’s my number” is a term that affects incumbent retailer during the campaign; a
negative term reduces customer loyalty. The Trustpower marketing campaign is consid-
ered for effects on Trustpower utility and Contact utility. Demographics and weather
characteristics are interacted with relative price; hence a positive number indicates that
the characteristic makes a customer more price sensitive. Dummy variables for firms
capture Contact’s position as incumbent retailer; other firms are less popular, ceteris
paribus. T-stats are constructed using standard errors that are robust to errors clustered
by ICP.
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cut. The initial response to the director remuneration amongst movers is across the board
lower (more negative, or, where positive, less positive), suggesting that more mobile
customers were moving away from Contact. However, examining the recovery of lost
customers, these still suggest a strong response to incentives to return to Contact after
the event.
Not surprisingly, the “What’s my number?” campaign had a stronger effect on this
group than on the population as a whole, although Trustpower’s marketing was not as
significant. Tiny Mighty Power’s entry remains insignificant, and the Earthquake has
similar effects on this subgroup as to the population as a whole.
Interestingly, we see stronger demographic and environmental effects for this sub-
sample. Urban (high ICP density areas) are more price sensitive, as are areas with larger
houses. Higher incomes are less sensitive, as are older people. Rain (winter) remains
a source of higher price sensitivity, but this is coupled with sun and temperature. Soil
moisture is still insignificant as an explanatory variable, but increases considerably in
magnitude, both as coefficient and t-statistic. It is interesting to note that house size,
income, and ICP density coefficients changed sign between the full sample and the sample
of movers. This sheds some light on the population of movers versus non-movers. Movers
with low income, large houses, and who live in urban areas are found to be more price
sensitive. In contrast, in the whole population, people with high income, small houses,
and who live in rural areas are more price sensitive. This suggests that non-movers may
often be people with low income, large houses and who live in urban areas. Regardless
of the sample, older individuals are less price sensitive, suggesting that these contribute
both to the non-mover population, and also are less price sensitive even when mobile.
Laslty, our firm dummies reiterate that Contact enjoys a privileged position in the
Mainpower region, although this is more muted than with the full sample, with lower
t-statistics, and significantly lower (in absolute value) coefficients.
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Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat
Incumbent 5.7557 326.9383
Relative Price -11.7114 -43.2652
Director Remuneration Events
Director 1 0.3484 2.4317 What’s my number? -1.0183 -27.3002
Director 2 0.4855 3.2601 Trustpower campaign 1.6433 28.8382
Director 3 0.4406 3.0196 Contact TP campaign -0.6364 -17.1335
Director 4 -0.7185 -8.4000 Tiny Mighty Power -0.3630 -1.3109
Director 5 -1.1146 -15.3424 Sep. 2010 EQ 0.6121 18.1047
Director 6 -0.3718 -3.5592 Feb. 2011 EQ -0.2345 -5.3185
Director 7 -0.7148 -7.9852
Director 8 0.1048 0.8608
Director 9 -0.1098 -0.9935 Price Interaction
Director 10 -0.0807 -0.7202 ICP Density -0.1093 -3.0733
Director 11 0.1550 1.2353 Prop 4 bedrooms -0.0028 -4.6328
Director 12 -0.2836 -2.7521 Prop 100K+ income 0.0019 2.2570
Prop Age 65+ 0.0014 2.1542
Contact recovery of lost customers Rain -0.0005 -3.2974
Old Cont. * Dir 1 – – Sun 0.0008 5.3075
Old Cont. * Dir 2 2.0250 2.0090 Soil Moisture 0.0014 1.2933
Old Cont. * Dir 3 1.2883 1.2837 Temperature 0.0067 3.3163
Old Cont. * Dir 4 1.9278 3.3237 ICP Dens.*Soil M. 0.0013 1.1569
Old Cont. * Dir 5 1.4037 2.7724
Old Cont. * Dir 6 -0.6048 -0.6034 Firm dummies
Old Cont. * Dir 7 0.3590 0.6183 Meridan Dummy -0.0420 -2.0607
Old Cont. * Dir 8 0.7576 1.9903 TMP Dummy -0.1718 -2.0439
Old Cont. * Dir 9 1.2988 4.6229 Genesis Dummy -1.2498 -30.5762
Old Cont. * Dir 10 0.7142 1.9953 Trustpower Dummy -1.4203 -26.6994
Old Cont. * Dir 11 1.0585 3.6217 Mercury Dummy -0.3977 -8.0032
Old Cont. * Dir 12 1.2295 4.6891 Pulse Dummy -0.7278 -6.4281
Table 4: Results for customer switching behaviour, where sample is restricted to cus-
tomers who switched at least once during the sample period. Variables are as discussed
in Table 3.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of consumer sensitivity to governance aspects of retail-
ers/gentailers, over and above responsiveness to price differences. We find that there was
a small response by Contact customers to news about Contact’s Directors’ compensa-
tion packages. However, more significant customer movements occurred in response to
Trustpower’s marketing of itself as having a more desirable governance structure to its
competitors. Was this partly made more effective by being preceded by the remuneration
incident? It is difficult to say.
Potential areas for future research would be to obtain more disaggregated data for
electricity usage, allowing for better control for monthly bill size on switching behaviour.
Examining effects in other regions could also be fruitful, since results for North Canter-
bury may be different due to Contact’s dominant position in the retail market there.
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